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Book Review: This Is How They Tell Me
the World Ends: The Cyberweapons
Arms Race (2020) by Nicole Perlroth
Amy C. Gaudion*
In May of 2017, the WannaCry attack, later attributed to North
Korea and Russia respectively, resulted in the loss of billions of
dollars for governments and private companies across the globe.
Only one month later, the NotPetya attack, later attributed to
Russia, wreaked additional and more devastating havoc, again on
a global scale. Both attacks exploited a vulnerability found in the
Microsoft Windows operating system. The U.S. government had
discovered that same vulnerability several years earlier. However,
rather than notifying Microsoft of the vulnerability so that it could be
patched, the U.S. government decided to keep the discovery of the
vulnerability a secret, and to retain it for intelligence collection and
national security purposes. 1
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Lawyering Skills, Penn
State Dickinson Law.
1. Lily Hay Newman, The Leaked NSA Spy Tool That Hacked the World,
WIRED (Mar. 7, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3GkveVi [https://perma.cc/G2KU3ZPQ]. After discovering the vulnerability, the National Security Agency developed
a set of hacking tools called Eternal Blue designed to exploit the software
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In October of 2021, the media reported that the FBI “refrained
for almost three weeks from helping to unlock the computers of
hundreds of businesses and institutions” impacted by the July 2021
ransomware attack conducted by REvil, a Russia-based criminal
gang, even though the FBI had acquired the digital key needed to
do so. 2 The FBI decided against sharing the key with the companies
affected, so that it could be utilized as part of an on-going operation
to investigate and take down REvil’s criminal network. 3
These incidents highlight the trade-offs implicated in the U.S.
government’s use of cyber tools and capabilities, and especially its
purchasing, use, and stockpiling of zero-day vulnerabilities. At the
general level, a vulnerability is a “weakness in an information
system or its components (e.g., system security procedures,
hardware design, internal controls) that could be exploited or impact
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information,” 4 and a zeroday vulnerability is “a software or hardware flaw for which there is
no existing patch.” 5 A small group of legal and information security
scholars and commentators have examined this subject, carefully
recording the competing interests at stake, the governing legal and
policy frameworks, and the consequences both anticipated and
vulnerability for intelligence collection and defense purposes. The hacking tools
were later leaked by a group known as Shadow Brokers, and led to the
development of WannaCry, NotPetya, and other malware. While the NSA has not
officially acknowledged its role or use of Eternal Blue, other reports and Microsoft
have corroborated its NSA origins. For a detailed history of this episode, see
NICOLE PERLROTH, THIS IS HOW THEY TELL ME THE WORLD ENDS: THE CYBER
WEAPONS ARMS RACE 308–09, 340–41, 347–49 (2020); see also ANDY GREENBERG,
SANDWORM: A NEW ERA IN CYBERWAR AND THE HUNT FOR THE KREMLIN’S MOST
DANGEROUS HACKERS 164–65, 182–83 (2020); BEN BUCHANAN, THE HACKER AND THE
STATE: CYBER ATTACKS AND THE NEW NORMAL OF GEOPOLITICS 253–54 (2020). No
U.S. law prohibited this decision. Rather, in assessing whether to disclose or to
retain a vulnerability, the U.S. government follows an internal executive branch
policy called the Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP). The VEP is an interagency
mechanism that seeks to balance
whether to disseminate vulnerability information to the vendor/supplier in
the expectation that it will be patched, or to temporarily restrict the
knowledge of the vulnerability to the USG, and potentially other partners,
so that it can be used for national security and law enforcement purposes,
such as intelligence collection, military operations, and/or
counterintelligence.
THE VULNERABILITIES EQUITES POLICY AND PROCESS FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 1
(2017), https://bit.ly/3x7OxDC [https://perma.cc/8JC8-W4SC] [hereinafter VEP].
2. Ellen Nakashima & Rachel Lerman, FBI Held Back Ransomware
Decryption Key from Businesses to Run Operation Targeting Hackers, WASH. POST
(Sept. 21, 2021), https://wapo.st/3BAfYqy.
3. Id.
4. This is the definition included in the VEP, supra note 1, at 12.
5. PERLROTH, supra note 1, at 7.
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unintended. 6 In many ways, however, the U.S. government’s
engagement in the vulnerability market has remained a practice in
the shadows, and its impacts are understood by few people inside
or outside the U.S. government. In This Is How They Tell Me the
World Ends: The Cyberweapons Arms Race, published at the end
of 2020, author Nicole Perlroth attempts to bring this practice out of
the shadows.
In the book, Perlroth traces the development and use of cyber
capabilities, focusing on the U.S. government’s unintended role in
creating a market for these cyber goods. Her purpose is a
straightforward one: to illuminate. Perlroth explains that her goal is
to “help shine even a glimmer of light on the highly secretive and
largely invisible cyberweapons industry so that we, a society on the
cusp of this digital tsunami called the Internet of Things, may have
some of the necessary conversations now, before it is too late.” 7
She seeks to accomplish this purpose by offering a treatise-like
treatment of the subject, defining terms, tracking the historical
development of governmental cyber capabilities and the parallel
growth of a vulnerability broker industry, identifying key players and
entities in the market, and profiling a slew of cyber operations and
events. Despite the length and breadth of the book, her thesis is
precise and blunt: the U.S. government’s practice of purchasing
vulnerabilities for use in law enforcement, intelligence collection,
and military operations led to a black market for these tools and an
arms race between governments and an array of questionablymotivated private actors. She argues that the U.S. government’s
myopic focus on the offensive use of these cyber tools, and its
corresponding failure to anticipate or consider the consequences of
that offensive focus, led to unexpected and negative results for the
United States and the world.

6. See, e.g., Tristian Caulfield et al., The U.S. Vulnerabilities Equities
Process: An Economic Perspective, UCL DISCOVERY, https://bit.ly/3oSaNO2
[https://perma.cc/YX7X-VV99] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021); Sharon Bradford
Franklin, The Need for Countries to Establish Robust and Transparent
Vulnerabilities Equities Processes, 6 FLETCHER SEC. REV. 46, 46–47 (2019); SVEN
HERPIG, GOVERNMENTAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT: WEIGHING
TEMPORARY RETENTION VERSUS IMMEDIATE DISCLOSURE OF 0-DAY VULNERABILITIES
(2018), https://bit.ly/3x9DIRC [https://perma.cc/CTK2-ASBF]; Stephanie Pell The
Ethical Imperative for a Vulnerability Equities Process and How the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System Can Aid that Process, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1549–90,
(2017); Ari Schwartz & Rob Knake, Government’s Role in Vulnerability Disclosure:
Creating a Permanent and Accountable Vulnerability Equities Process (Harv.
Kennedy Sch. Belfer Ctr., Discussion Paper 2016-04, 2016).
7. PERLROTH, supra note 1, at xiv.
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The book unabashedly is written for the layperson. As Perlroth
notes in the first chapter, “Not only did I not know anything about
cybersecurity, I had actively gone out of my way to not know
anything about cybersecurity.” 8 Her realization, of course, is that
she should know—and that we all need to know more about
cybersecurity. This is a book designed for that task, to raise
awareness among the non-cyber crowd of a phenomenon that has
occurred mostly out of public view. 9 She identifies this phenomenon
as the acceleration in use and increase in potency of government
hacking tools. Other authors also have lamented the public’s ability
to appreciate or grasp how this phenomenon impacts day-to-day
life. Ben Buchanan writes that although,
everyone on the internet is caught in the crossfire . . . this
struggle does not manifest itself in public debates at the United
Nations or even the discreet summits of international leaders. It
does not rely on conspicuous military mobilizations or troops that
serve as human trip wires. Instead, it flows through vast server
farms, ad hoc networks of unwitting participants, third-party
states, and homes and workplaces nearly everywhere. 10

Perlroth’s aim is to illuminate for the general public this
phenomenon, to identify its participants, and to draw the contours
of the battlefield in which it is taking place. As such, the book
provides an imminently satisfying and fast read, almost achieving
the page-turner status of fictional political thrillers. If you are
listening to it as an audio book, you will want simultaneously to
increase the speed to 1.5 to see what happens next, and then slow
the speed to 0.5 to ensure you do not miss an important detail.
Many of the events and actors will be familiar to those in the national
security and cyber fields, but the author weaves the threads
together in a way that even an individual steeped in the subject will
learn something new and will appreciate the temporal and
substantive connections she delivers.
The book’s structure operates on several levels. The first level
divides the book by the type of cyber actor, as Perlroth profiles
government entities of both intelligence and military varieties,
private companies engaged in both the development and use of
cyber tools and in providing cybersecurity (or defensive) services,
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at xvii (“But had we all been paying closer attention, we might have seen
the blaring red warning lights, the compromised servers in Singapore and Holland,
the blackouts, the code spiking out in all directions. We might have seen the end
game wasn’t Ukraine. It was us.”).
10. BUCHANAN, supra note 1, at 9.
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hackers of all stripes from across the black, grey, and white hat
worlds, and vulnerability brokers. Within each part, she offers three
or four chapters, which are generally organized by cyber event,
operation, or tool. The double-layered structure takes the reader
skipping across decades as Perlroth chronicles real world case
studies and offers in-depth profiles of the key players, both
individuals and organizations, in the cyberweapon marketplace.
What makes the book such a compelling read, however, is the
author’s ability to draw the reader in through the use of personal
vignettes in which Perlroth is a character in the action as it unfolds,
anticipating the reader’s questions.
Before turning to an evaluation of the book’s contributions and
weaknesses, it is helpful to consider where this work sits among
others. Perlroth joins an ambitious group of journalists, scholars,
and former government officials who have attempted to outline the
contours of the shadowy world of vulnerability brokers and the
growth of the zero-day vulnerability market. These include, most
notably Ben Buchanan’s The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks
and the New Normal of Geopolitics (2020) and Andy Greenberg’s
Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s
Most Dangerous Hackers (2019), as well as incisive reporting
efforts by Chris Bing and Ellen Nakashima. 11 The book also
complements those that have explored the U.S. government’s
efforts to develop and use cyber weapons, including David Sanger’s
The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age
(2018), and Kim Zetter’s Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the
Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon (2014).
Perlroth’s contributions with this work are the most significant
in four areas: (1) describing the current state of affairs in the
cyberweapons marketplace; (2) providing comprehensive
descriptions of instances where the state actors (or statesponsored actors) have deployed their cyber capabilities; (3)
11. See, e.g., Joseph Menn & Chris Bing, Governments Turn Tables on
Ransomware Gang REvil by Pushing It Offline, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2021, 6:45 PM),
https://reut.rs/3GDzLZX [https://perma.cc/WWY8-4LBY]; Chris Bing, U.S. Moves
to Control Sales of Hacking Tools Abroad, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2021, 1:11 PM),
https://reut.rs/3mBdOCC [https://perma.cc/5NW7-E4J3]; Chris Bing & Joel
Schectman, Inside the UAE’s Secret Hacking Team of American Mercenaries,
REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2019), https://reut.rs/3EH5mrT [https://perma.cc/SC3W-T5LV];
Ellen Nakashima & Craig Timberg, NSA Officials Worried About the Day Its Potent
Hacking Tool Would Get Loose. Then it Did, WASH. POST (May 16, 2017),
https://wapo.st/3BClhFV [https://perma.cc/6DUW-9RQQ]; Ellen Nakashima, The
Cybersecurity 202: Here’s Why NSA Rushed to Expose a Dangerous Computer
Bug, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2020, 7:55AM), https://wapo.st/2Zl3ekP
[https://perma.cc/M4LR-G5TJ].
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exploring how the U.S. government’s actions in cyberspace may
have contributed to the current cyberweapons marketplace; and (4)
supplying a well-researched, and helpfully indexed, primer for the
cyber layperson.
The book’s first contribution is its gripping and thorough
account of the cyberweapons industry and in particular the zeroday vulnerabilities market. The author describes its origins, its
pricing structure, its codes of professional conduct and deal-making
norms, its sellers, its buyers, and the cybersecurity firms and
researchers that attempt to study it. For example, she explains how
the price of a vulnerability went from $400 in the early days of the
market to $4,000 only 3 years later to around $50,000 5 years on. 12
She also explains the practice of stockpiling vulnerabilities, and
unearths the U.S. government’s practice of doing so. While other
scholars and journalists have profiled this market, 13 Perlroth brings
it into sharp focus through her personal encounters with many of
the central figures in the market. These include deep character
sketches, most notably of John P. Watters, 14 Alfredo Ortgega, 15
Adriel Desautels, 16 Dave Aitel, 17 Chaouki Bekrar, 18 and John
Hultquist. 19 Recognizing the ambitiousness of the task before her,
Perlroth writes that “getting to the bottom of the zero-day market
was a fool’s errand.” 20 While she might not make it to the bottom,
she takes the reader on a rollicking ride well-beneath the surface.
The book’s second contribution is its comprehensive
descriptions of instances where state actors (or state-sponsored
actors) have deployed their cyber capabilities, with a particular
12. PERLROTH, supra note 1, at 39–40. The owner of iDefense told the author
that “the first thousand bugs iDefense paid $200,000 for in the first [18] months of
the program would have cost $10 million today.” Id. at 40.
13. See SVEN HRAPIG ET AL., MARKETS FOR CYBERCRIME TOOLS & STOLEN DATA
(2014), https://bit.ly/3BAAw1W [https://perma.cc/T8BW-4NT2].
14. PERLROTH, supra note 1, at 22–35, 289–90. Watters is the owner of
iDefense, an early corporate player in the cybersecurity field, and one of the first
companies to hire hackers and “start paying bounties for zero-day bugs.” Id. at 29.
15. Id. at 259–62. Alfredo Ortgega is an Argentinian hacker known to many
as the Cyber Gaucho.
16. Id. at 165–75. The author describes Adriel Desautels as “a cyberweapon
merchant who looked like a milkman,” and someone who brought a moral compass
sniff test to his work. Id. at 165.
17. Id. at 259–62. Dave Aitel is a former NSA hacker, arguably disgruntled,
who went on to author The Shellcoder’s Handbook: Discovering and Exploiting
Security Holes and to establish Immunity Inc.
18. Id. at 218–19. Chaouki Bekrar is known as the “Wolf of Wuln Street.”
19. Id. at 290–93. Hultquist is a former army reservist and one of the key
cybersecurity researchers tracking the origins of the BlackEnergy malware.
20. Id. at 21
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focus on U.S. cyber operations. The book provides rich descriptions
of each operation’s origin and development, its intended purpose,
and its actual (occasionally unintended) impact and effect. For
example, the author guides the reader through China’s cyber
operations against Google (2009–2010) [labeled “Aurora” by
cybersecurity researchers] and the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management (2014); Iran’s cyber activities against Aramco, the
Sands Casino, and the U.S. banking industry; Russia’s efforts with
NotPetya (2017), Black Energy/Sandworm and, of course, the 2016
hack of the DNC servers; and North Korea’s cyber operation
against Sony Pictures and its development of the WannaCry
ransomware attack. She offers a deeper dive on the U.S.
government’s cyber activities, focusing particular attention on
Olympic Games, an operation that utilized the Stuxnet worm to slow
Iranian nuclear capabilities, and the Eternal Blue tool/exploit.
The third contribution this book makes to the field is its effort to
draw a causal connection between the U.S. government’s actions
and the frenzied and precipitous state of the cyberweapons
marketplace. According to Perlroth, the U.S. government’s decision
to focus on the offensive side of the cyber house, while ignoring the
defensive effort, led to two types of problems. First, the United
States slipped from being a state with dominating cyber powers to
only one player among many with comparable capabilities. This
hubris is reflected best in the Nobody But Us or “NOBUS”
framework:
The premise behind NOBUS was that low-hanging fruit—
vulnerabilities that could easily be discovered and abused by
American adversaries—should be fixed and turned over to
vendors for patching. But more advanced exploitation— the kind
of advanced zero-days the agency believed only it had the
powers, resources and skills to exploit—would remain in the
agency’s stockpile and be used to spy on American enemies or
degrade their systems in the case of cyberwar. 21

Second, she argues that the myopic focus on developing
offensive cyber tools caused the U.S. government to fail to see the
asymmetry challenge coming around the bend. 22 While not
agreeing with the cause, others have described the asymmetry
problem as well. In a 2018 article, Jack Goldsmith & Stuart Russell
explained how the strengths of American society—including
commitments to free speech, privacy, and the rule of law, innovative
21. Id. at 136–37.
22. Perlroth, supra note 1, at xxv.
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technology firms, relatively unregulated markets, digital
sophistication—would “create asymmetrical vulnerabilities in the
digital age that foreign adversaries” could increasingly exploit. 23
Perlroth’s contribution is to connect the timing dots for this causal
link. For example, she walks in painstaking detail through the NSA’s
acquisition (or purchase) of the EternalBlue exploit, its development
into a tool, the government’s decision to use it for seven years for
intelligence collection and other national security purposes (rather
than disclosing it to Microsoft), its eventual disclosure to the
vulnerability marketplace by the ShadowBrokers dump, and then its
adapted revision by North Korea and Russia in the WannaCry and
NotPetya operations, respectively. 24 Through this and other
examples, she illustrates that the U.S. government’s failure to
disclose certain vulnerabilities created a “boomerang effect”
whereby cyber tools utilized by the U.S. government agencies for
intelligence collection, law enforcement, or national security
purposes, often came back to wallop U.S. companies and
individuals, and even other agencies within the U.S. government
agencies.
The fourth contribution Perlroth makes is her service as a
lantern-holding guide through a treatise-like and comprehensive
primer for the cyber layperson. The author decodes technologically
challenging concepts and material, bringing her journalist toolkit to
the task of making the topic accessible. She humbly places herself
in the book in the role of the confused novice trying to understand
the topic and the landscape. This device works quite effectively as
she navigates the reader through major cyber events, while offering
profiles of the entities responsible for those events. She covers the
well-known operations and players, while also covering several
lesser-known but equally important ones. By the end of the book,
the reader has a solid understanding of the characteristics that
define the Russian hacking groups 25 (including the Internet
Research Agency, Cozy Bear, Energetic Bear, and Fancy Bear),

23. JACK GOLDSMITH & STUART RUSSELL, STRENGTHS BECOME VULNERABILITIES:
HOW A DIGITAL WORLD DISADVANTAGES THE UNITED STATES IN ITS INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 1–17 (2018), https://hvr.co/3jWyZxr [https://perma.cc/9WU9-CU6V]
(“These asymmetrical vulnerabilities, in turn, might explain why the United States
so often appears to be on the losing end of recent cyber operations and why US
attempts to develop and implement policies to enhance defense, resiliency,
response, or deterrence in the cyber realm have been ineffective.”).
24. PERLROTH, supra note 1, at 308–09, 347–49.
25. Id. at 292, 306, 310–11, 312, 361–62.
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the ShadowBrokers, 26 the NSO Group, 27 as well as the Chinese 28
and North Korean 29 cyber units. Her book is thoroughly researched
drawing from a number of empirical data sets as well as sources
including hackers, vulnerability brokers, cybersecurity researchers,
journalists, employees of social media and technology companies,
and current and former government officials. Indeed, the word
“They” in the title references this host of sources. Adhering to her
role as a guide, and her stated intention to “help shine even a
glimmer of light on the highly secretive and largely invisible
cyberweapons industry,” 30 Perlroth is candid in pointing out what
she doesn’t know.
While the book is an excellent contribution to this field and
fulfils its goal of raising awareness among the non-cyber crowd, it
suffers from weaknesses in three general areas: (1) it gives too little
attention to the debates within the U.S. government regarding the
use of cyber capabilities; (2) it fails to effectively incorporate the
legal and policy authorities that shape and constrain the U.S.
government’s actions in the cyberspace; and (3) it overstates the
danger in certain areas (“the world ends”) at the expense of
recognizing the more likely low-grade and pressing threats.
First, the book fails to discuss the complexity, nuance, and
evolution of the U.S. government’s cyber strategy and approach to
the cyber domain. Perlroth creates the impression that the U.S.
government, from the Bush to Obama to Trump administrations,
unabashedly endorsed an aggressive posture in cyberspace,
focused only on the offensive side of the equation. In practice,
however, there were continuous, robust, and difficult debates—
within each of the administrations—on how to strike the appropriate
balance between the use of cyber tools for offensive purposes and
the need to adequately engage in cyber defense of both
government and private sector networks. The contours of these
debates can be found in Richard Clarke and Robert Knake’s book
Fifth Domain, 31 and in a series of competing articles between Jason
Healey and Dmitri Alperovitch. 32 For example, the Bush
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 320–32.
Id. at 177–85.
Id. at 200–01, 205–09.
Id. at 333–37.
Id. at xiv.
See generally RICHARD CLARKE & ROBERT KNAKE, THE FIFTH DOMAIN:
DEFENDING OUR COUNTRY, OUR COMPANIES, AND OURSELVES IN THE AGE OF CYBER
THREATS (2019).
32. See, e.g., Great Power Cyber Party, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Apr. 19, 2021),
https://bit.ly/3ECqeQY [https://perma.cc/8Q2Y-764L] (containing the conversation
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administration did not easily come to the decision to approve the
use of the Stuxnet virus in the Olympic Games operation. 33 A
second example can be found in the policy directives that outline
the executive branch’s approval process for military cyber
operations. The Obama administration was often criticized for
making the inter-agency process for the approval of military cyber
operations too cumbersome and time-consuming, one which left
U.S. Cyber Command looking feeble. Presidential Policy Directive
20 (PPD-20) 34 was an 18-page classified directive that laid out an
extensive interagency process for the approval of military cyber
operations, and required presidential approval for offensive and
defensive cyber operations with effects outside U.S. government
networks. In August of 2018, the Trump Administration significantly
revamped the Obama-era approval process for high-level cyber
operations, describing it as an “offensive step forward.” 35 A third
example of the complexity and nuance of the U.S. government’s
approach can be found in the development and eventual publication
in 2017 of Vulnerabilities Equities Policy Process (VEP). 36 The VEP
guides the decision-making process when the U.S. government
discovers exploitable weaknesses, or vulnerabilities, in information
systems. It is the process by which the government decides
whether to disclose the security flaws it discovers or to keep the
between Healey and Alperovitch); Dmitri Alperovitch & Ian Ward, How Should the
U.S. Respond to the SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange Hacks?, LAWFARE (Mar.
12, 2021, 10:59 AM), https://bit.ly/3btly3n [https://perma.cc/L4QD-DPVQ];
Homeland Cybersecurity: Assessing Cyber Threats and Building Resilience:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 117th Cong. (2021) (statement
of Dmitri Alperovitch, Exec. Chairman, Silverado Pol’y Accelerator); Jason Healey
& Robert Jervis, The Escalation Inversion and Other Oddities of Situational Cyber
Stability, 3 TEX. NAT’L SEC. REV. 30 (2020).
33. See DAVID SANGER, CONFRONT & CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND
SURPRISING USE OF AMERICAN POWER 188–225 (2012).
34. Dustin Volz, Trump, Seeking to Relax Roles on U.S. Cyberattacks,
Reverses Obama Directive, WALL ST. J., https://on.wsj.com/2Y6uKaN
[https://perma.cc/J8H9-GQFV] (Aug. 15, 2018, 11:36 PM).
35. Id. Although National Security Presidential Memorandum 13 (NSPM 13)
remains classified, media reporting indicates that it accomplished three significant
changes. First, it loosened the interagency approval process. Second, it shortened
the approval timeline to allow for more responsive actions. Third, it removed the
presidential approval requirement for cyber operations that fell below the use of
force (or similar) thresholds, and delegated that decision-making authority to
others within the chain of command. See Robert Chesney, The Pentagon’s
General Counsel on the Law of Military Operations in Cyberspace, LAWFARE (Mar.
9, 2020, 12:33 PM), https://bit.ly/3mA9ROL [https://perma.cc/P4VP-5RCM]; Ellen
Nakashima, White House Authorizes ‘Offensive Cyber Operations’ to Deter
Foreign Adversaries, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2018), https://wapo.st/3Bw14RT
[https://perma.cc/GC2E-JVLJ]; Volz, supra note 34.
36. PERLROTH, supra note 1, at 401–03 (describing the VEP, supra note 1).

GAUDION FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/9/2022 11:14 AM

2022] BOOK REVIEW: THIS IS HOW THEY TELL ME THE WORLD ENDS

111

flaws secret for national security, intelligence, or law enforcement
purposes. According to the charter, the VEP provides an
interagency mechanism that seeks to balance
whether to disseminate vulnerability information to the
vendor/supplier in the expectation that it will be patched, or to
temporarily restrict the knowledge of the vulnerability to the
USG, and potentially other partners, so that it can be used for
national security and law enforcement purposes, such as
intelligence
collection,
military
operations,
and/or
counterintelligence. 37

The VEP was initiated in the Bush Administration, tacitly
acknowledged in the Obama administration, and formally published
(at least in part) in the Trump Administration. Perlroth’s portrayal of
Michael Daniel 38 comes closest to recognizing the complexity and
nuance of the U.S. government’s attempts to balance the offensive
and defensive considerations. Daniel was serving as the
cybersecurity czar in the Obama administration when Perlroth met
with him in 2015. His haggard appearance and tired but earnest
responses to her questions reveal the difficulty of the debates, and
his own concerns about whether the government was striking the
balance appropriately. Daniel is one of the few government officials
that Perlroth identifies as having concerns; however, he was not
alone. 39 By giving less attention to the voices that counseled
against an overly offensive approach, she creates the impression
that the U.S. government has been particularly careless, bordering
on reckless. The book fails to appreciate that many officials in the
U.S. government were calling for a more defensive posture, and for
recognition of the reciprocity (what Perlroth refers to as the
“boomerang effect”) problem.
The book’s second oversight is its failure to adequately discuss
the existing legal and policy frameworks governing the U.S.
government’s development and use of cyber capabilities. One may
come away from the book with the impression that this is a lawless
domain. While there are certainly debates as to which laws apply
and in what way, there are indeed laws, both domestic and
international, that govern state conduct in cyberspace. 40 In addition,
37. VEP, supra note 1, at 1.
38. PERLROTH, supra note 1, at 302–09.
39. See generally CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 31; BUCHANAN, supra note 1.
40. A sample of relevant U.S. legal authorities include: War Powers
Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1550; the covert action reporting requirements, 50
U.S.C. § 3093; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885;
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030. For example, 10 U.S.C.
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the book gives only scant attention to the slew of executive branch
strategy and policy documents, published in 2018, which reflected
a shift from a deterrence-based strategy in cyberspace to a “defend
forward” concept, and the embrace of a more aggressive posture in
the cyber domain. 41 The DoD Cyber Strategy provided: “We will
Section 394(a), initially enacted in 2015 and amended in 2018 by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, provides general authorization for
military cyber operations. Specifically, it authorizes the Secretary of Defense to
prepare for, and when appropriately authorized, to conduct “military cyber activities
or operations in cyberspace, including clandestine military activities or operations
in cyberspace, to defend the United States and its allies, including in response to
malicious cyber activity carried out against the United States or a United States
person by a foreign power.” 10 U.S.C. § 394(a). Section 394(b), which was added
in 2018 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
affirmed an expansive reading of these authorities, providing the U.S. military was
authorized to conduct cyber activities or operations “short of hostilities” and to
conduct such operations outside areas of active hostilities. 10 U.S.C. § 394(c). In
addition, and most notably, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019 included specific pre-authorization for U.S. military cyber and information
operations in response to certain types of cyber actions by certain state actors.
Section 1642, included in the notes to 10 U.S.C. § 394, is labeled “Active Defense
Against the Russian Federation, People’s Republic of China, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, and Islamic Republic of Iran Attacks in Cyberspace.” The
provision authorizes the Secretary of Defense, acting through U.S. Cyber
Command, to take “appropriate and proportional action in foreign cyberspace”
against Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran if the National Command Authority
determines that one of those states “is conducting an active, systematic, and
ongoing campaign of attacks against the Government or people of the United
States in cyberspace.” According to reports, U.S. Cyber Command has not been
hesitant in deploying its capabilities pursuant to this authority. Mark Pomerleau,
New Authorities Mean Lots of New Missions at Cyber Command, FIFTH DOMAIN
(May 8, 2019), https://bit.ly/3EDHyEG [https://perma.cc/34B2-QDMY].
A sample of relevant international legal authorities and other sources of guidance
include: U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (prohibition on the use of force); id. (sovereignty);
id. ¶¶ 4, 7 (prohibition on intervention); DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL
§ 16.2.1. (2016); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER OPERATIONS (2d ed. 2017); Open-Ended Working Group on Developments
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security, Final Substantive Report, U.N. Doc. A/AC.290/2021/CRP.2 (2021); Paul
C. Ney, Jr, General Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Remarks at the U.S. Cyber Command
Legal Conference (Mar. 2, 2020); Brian J. Egan, International Law and Stability in
Cyberspace, Remarks at Berkeley Law School (Nov. 10, 2016); Harold H. Koh,
Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Law in Cyberspace, Remarks at
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012).
41. In April of 2018, the executive branch published the Command Vision for
U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. CYBER COMMAND, ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN CYBERSPACE
SUPERIORITY: COMMAND VISION FOR US CYBER COMMAND
(2018),
https://bit.ly/3w7YcKb [https://perma.cc/F7NK-P7FX], followed in September of
2018 by the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, DEP’T OF DEF., CYBER
STRATEGY 2018 (2018), https://bit.ly/2Y9olvu [https://perma.cc/T46K-K9RJ] (the
unclassified summary) and the White House National Cyber Strategy, NATIONAL
CYBER STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2018) https://bit.ly/3kXlqho
[https://perma.cc/HA4U-NBNS].
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defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its
source, including activity that falls below the level of armed
conflict.” 42 In a more recent articulation of the defend forward
concept, General Paul M. Nakasone described it as an approach
that acknowledges “that defending the United States in cyberspace
requires executing operations outside the U.S. military’s networks
and that the country cannot afford to wait for attacks to come its
way.” 43
The failure to incorporate the legal and policy frameworks into
the book’s thesis contributed to a related oversight: the failure to
distinguish between cyber activities conducted for different
purposes and by different U.S. governmental entities. For example,
the balance between offensive and defensive resources may be
struck differently when the cyber tool is used for law enforcement
purposes (by entities like the FBI or local entities), for intelligence
collection (by agencies like the CIA or NSA), for covert cyber
operations (conducted by the CIA), or for clandestine cyber
operations (conducted by the U.S. military, usually U.S. Cyber
Command). While it would be beyond the book’s scope (and more
appropriately suited to a law review article) to offer an in-depth
analysis of these authorities, it would be helpful for the reader to
appreciate that the legal and policy authorities exist, and that the
constraints on government action will differ dependent on the cyber
tool’s purpose and the cyber actor.
Reviewers within the cybersecurity community have noted
factual errors in the book, leading to inaccurate timelines,
misunderstanding as to the technical capabilities of foreign
adversaries, and overstatements as to the threat posed. 44 While I
leave the technical critique to those more familiar and appropriately
trained, I agree that the author overstates the danger in certain
areas at the expense of recognizing the more likely and pressing
threats presented by the rapid and often un-watched development
of cyber capabilities. Although minor, this is the book’s third
42. DEP’T OF DEF., CYBER STRATEGY 2018 (2018), https://bit.ly/2Y9olvu
[https://perma.cc/T46K-K9RJ].
43. Paul M. Nakasone & Michael Sulmeyer, How to Compete in Cyberspace:
Cyber Command’s New Approach, FOREIGN AFFS. (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://fam.ag/3xhZtPm [https://perma.cc/X74F-CBBM].
44. Book Review: This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends by Nicole
PETERSON
(Apr.
13,
2021),
https://bit.ly/3pSb1XQ
Perlroth,
DALE
[https://perma.cc/B7KA-QN6T] (criticizing Perlroth for overstating Wolf Creek and
Dam examples); Edward M. Roche, This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends:
The Cyber-Weapons Arms Race, 14 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 133, 134 (2020) (“[I]t will
give a distorted and incomplete picture of the cyber arms race to many readers.”).
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weakness. An example of this is found in the book’s title, which
indicates the world may end tomorrow. On closer read, however, it
overstates the problem, which is a significant one but not likely
leading to the end of the world. In this sense, the author fails at
times to give a wholistic treatment to the tradeoffs implicated and
the realities of the cyber domain.
In sum, Perlroth’s book is a valuable contribution to the
debates and discussions surrounding the vulnerabilities market.
She achieves the purpose she set forth: to illuminate and educate
the layperson about the existence of the market, and how decisions
by governments can influence—and possibly even create—the
cyber weapons market. Indeed, a recent RAND Report indicates
the U.S. population is growing increasingly concerned about
ransomware. 45 Some have criticized Perlroth for providing a list of
muddled recommendations in the epilogue, and for failing to identify
specific solutions to the problems she identifies. However, she
comes by the muddle-ment honestly, and is most certainly not the
only commentator to conclude that this is an area without easy
solutions. Indeed, she recognizes this challenge throughout the
book, explaining that her objective is not to chart a course forward
but to raise awareness of the problem and to pose the important
questions.
Did the U.S. government’s use of Stuxnet cause the
development of the vulnerabilities market? Did the U.S. focus too
much on offensive cyber capabilities and fail to appreciate the
reciprocal consequences? I am not convinced Perlroth gets the
answers to these questions correct, however, she earns praise for
raising the questions. The book’s ultimate contribution is in
synthesizing the information and framing the questions that require
the attention of those government officials and corporate actors
responsible for their study and resolution.

45. Alan Suderman, Cyberattacks Concerning to Most in US: Pearson/APNORC Poll, AP NEWS (Oct. 11, 2021), https://bit.ly/2ZDIGcG.

